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THE PROBLEM OF DE NOVO JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
TN considering the problems inherent in the subject matter
J of this writing, as indicated by its title, a somewhat heter-
odoxical plan will be followed. Although de novo is the focal
point of this research its problem will be considered last. In
successive order summary treatment will be accorded: ad-
ministrative action, its nature and necessity; review of ad-
ministrative action, why and when it is necessary and the
forms it may take; judicial review of administrative action,
its-necessity, the forms it may take, and its advantages and
disadvantages in relation to other forms of review; the scope
of review' of administrative action generally; and, in conclu-
sion, the problem of de novo judicial review of administra-
tive action will be discussed in -the belief that the mere state-
ment of the problem with a showing of the dangers inherent
therein might serve as a warning to those faced with the
problem and prevent future inconsistent treatment thereof.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION.
By administrative action, as distinguished from other
forms of action, is meant the action by an administrative
agency of government. Such agency is almost impossible of
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general definition because it is universally the creature of
statute.' Due to the variety of provisions in the enabling
statutes few abstract concepts, common to all administrative
agencies, are possible of formulation. In general it may be
said that every administrative agency has been born out of
necessity, and has been created to assist one or more of the
customary branches of our tripartite government in their
efforts to police or to govern a particular industry, business
occupation or profession.
The powers of the administrative agency are purely stat-
utory,2 and are, therefore, as variable as the objectives oc-
casioning their creation. They become distinguished from or-
dinary governmental bureaus, because they commonly com-
bine powers of the several departments of the government,
and in time come to be known as administrative agencies,
and still later their law as administrative law.
"Action" is used in an all-inclusive sense, so as to include
within its meaning investigations, findings, orders, regula-
tions, rules, opinions and any other form of conduct of ad-
ministrative agencies.
So numerous have been the writings establishing the ne-
cessity for administrative action that it is no longer considered
available for elaborate discussion at this time. It is now gen-
erally accepted that any list of the reasons for administra-
tive action must include: necessity, due to the inexpertness
of either or both the legislative and judicial branches of the
government; necessity, due to the fact that continuous su-
pervision, on the part of a legislature not constantly in ses-
sion, is impossible; necessity, occasioned by the delay in
judicial determination which is at best a slow and costly
process;' necessity for experienced personnel which is not
1 "Statute" is used in its broadest connotation. It is appreciated that a Com-
mission of Bar Examiners may be an administrative agency although not technical-
ly created by a statute.
2 See note 1, ante, relative to the broad use of the term statutory.
8 See discussion of the telephone rate cases in the dissenting opinion by Mr.
Justice Brandeis in the case of St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298
U. S. 38, 88-92 (1936).
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generally available either in the legislature or in the courts.
In truth it has been correctly stated that "... this apparent
anomaly in government must simply be charged to neces-
sity." 4
In passing judgment upon administrative conduct pru-
dence demands a consideration of the reason why such acts
are being exercised by an administrative agency instead of
by one or several of the three customary departments of the
government. If the reason for the existence of the administra-
tive agency is the inadequacy of the court's ' previous treat-
ment of the subject matter, before the court superimposes
restrictions upon the agency and usurps its power to itself,
it should reflect upon the fact that the agency was created
largely because the court was unable to handle the matter.
If the agency is created because the judges are insufficiently
expert or without the resources to make the independent re-
search necessary to a completely satisfactory adjudication,
the court in passing upon the validity of administrative pow-
er and actions should hestitate and be very reluctant to nul-
lify the acts, because of a failure to provide all the protec-
tions of a judicial determination. Courts should realize that
if they were unable to handle the problem before the creation
of the administrative agency they will be equally impotent
upon a trial de novo in reviewing the agency's action.6
4 Stason, THE LAw or ADmINSTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, 4 (1937).
5 Due to the nature of this subject matter this article is taken solely in its
judicial aspect.
6 "The courts, as the agency charged with the application and development
of the whole law have a sweep as broad perforce as the needs of society, seem well
fitted to adjust the narrower judgment of specialists to the larger considerations
which the habits and dominant desires of the community make it necessary or
desirable to take into account. But in the exercise of their power to effect such
adjustments, they must use extraordinary tact and self-restraint if the special ad-
vantages of expert administration are to be preserved unimpaired. This fact is all
the more needful because, apart from statutory regulation, and even to some extent
in the teeth of such regulation, the scope of the courts' power to disregard ad-
ministrative policy is almost as wide as they themselves choose to make it."
Dickinson, Judicial Control of Official Discretion (1928) 22 Am. POL. Scr. REv.
275.
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II. REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATrEI ACTION.
That there is a necessity for review of administrative ac-
tion may be admitted without admitting that the review
should be so extensive as to take the place of the adminis-
trative agency itself. Review is generally considered neces-
sary in order that there be a government of laws and not of
men, and it is thought that by providing for review, in one
form or another, relief from arbitrary action upon the part
of the administrative agency is afforded.
A most effective way of controlling discretionary action,
other than by judicial review, is by the inclusion of "stand-
ards" in the enabling act creating the administrative agency.'
This places considerable premium upon the skill and tech-
nique of the individual draftsman of the enabling act, and
although proper draftsmanship is not to be deprecated, to
satisfy the exacting and varying court tests for the adequacy
of such standards the lawmaker must possess among other
attributes the power ordinarily associated with the clair-
voyant.' This device is also objectionable in that it disre-
gards the often important fact that a too great imposition
of checks upon the administrative will nullify its conduct al-
together, for in many instances broad discretion is the reason
for the agency itself.
Another effective way of controlling the possible abuse of
discretion is by a provision in the enabling act for adminis-
trative review. But this provision for review within the
agency itself is strenuously objected to on the ground that
it enables the administrative agency to be the judge of its
own case, which is allegedly contrary to sound political
theory. Too infrequently is it realized by the critic of admin-
istrative review that it is not the combination of the author-
7 Two important cases held the provisions of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act invalid because of the lack of such "standards" see: Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 389 (1935), and United States v. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry
Corp., 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
8 Landis, TrE ADMWISTRATIVE PROCESS, 51 (1938). Relative to the reliance
placed upon the capabilities of the individual draftsman.
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ity of the judge and prosecutor in one person that is to be
feared, but it is the power of prosecution which is pragmat-
ically the real threat. This becomes evident when it is con-
sidered that the mere threat of prosecution will deter any
business man from doing any contemplated action which is
allegedly illegal when he is so advised by the administrative
agency. Most frequently he will not risk possibility of such
suit, and therefore, will infrequently if ever make a test of
the case so that he will seldom be judged by the commission
or agency itself.9
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION.
A. Necessity for Judicial Review.
Despite the frequent statement that review is unneces-
sary for due process of law,"0 courts laboring under the mis-
apprehension that "due process of law" means judicial due
process, have frequently held that those aggrieved by the con-
duct of an administrative tribunal or agency are entitled to
judicial review of such administrative action, notwithstanding
the propriety and fairness of the agency's action. The United
States Supreme Court early held in the leading case of
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota," that
a railroad company was entitled to judicial review of a find-
ing of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission relative to a
rate for the carriage of milk, although the statute creating
the commission made final its findings as to the reasonable-
ness of the rates. Speaking through Mr. Justice Blatchford
the majority of the court held that such reasonableness was
"eminently a question for judicial investigation;" 1 2 where-
as Mr. Justice Bradley in dissenting believed that judicial re-
view was improper unless there was a "clear and unmistak-
9 Id., 91 et seq.
10 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Iaprovement Co., 18 How. (U. S.)
272 (1855).
11 134 U. S. 418 (1890).
12 See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908), holding that
ratemaking is a legislative function.
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able" invasion of rights, and that such invasion was not evi-
dent in the instant case.
Thirty years later the same Court speaking through Mr.
Justice McReynolds held in the well-known case of Ohio
Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,'3 that not only was
an order of the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission fix-
ing water rates subject to judicial review but that the stat-
utory form of judicial review by way of injunction was in-
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.
Ten years later the same Court in Federal Radio Commis-
sion v. General Electric Co.,'4 in construing the review pro-
visions of the Radio Act of 1927, held that the proceeding
in the Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia to review
the Radio Commission's action in issuance of a license was
purely administrative and not a "case or controversy" sub-
ject to review in the United States Supreme Court under the
Judiciary Article of the Federal Constitution.
To bring such Commission within the review of the Su-
preme Court Congress amended section 16 of the Radio Act
limiting review by the court of appeals to questions of law,
and making findings of fact conclusive if supported by sub-
stantial evidence. This was held to make the review judicial
in nature and therefore subject to review by the Supreme
Court. 5 As to the validity of the provision making findings
of fact conclusive, see infra, where this problem will be dis-
cussed along with the corollary problem of jurisdictional and
constitutional facts.
In holding that although "the reserved power to repeal a
grant of special privileges implies that it may be exerted at
the pleasure of the Legislature or other authority in which
the power to repeal is vested," if the grant is repealed be-
cause of condition broken judicial determination is neces-
18 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
14 281 U. S. 464 (1930).
15 Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U. S. 266 (1933).
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sary. The Supreme Court almost created a distinction with-
out a difference in its endeavor to preserve judicial review.
Indeed, did they strain logic when they said in Public Service
Commission of Puerto Rico v. Havemeyer 16 that although
the Public Service Commission could repeal a grant of au-
thority to take water for irrigation purposes, by a simple ap-
propriate declaration of such repeal, it could not "cancel for
violation of the terms of the grant, without giving to the
holder an opportunity to have the asserted default judicially
determined."
B. Methods of, Judicial Review.
Having summarily surveyed the Supreme Court's view as
to the alleged necessity for judicial review of administrative
action, before considering the scope of such review a cursory
examination of the possible methods available for the review
is necessary. It is at once apparent that the available forms
are capable of being classified into two main divisions with a
varying number of sub-divisions in each.
In the first division may be placed the accepted "common
law" "7 or traditional methods of review which have had
limited use in the review of administrative conduct, such as,
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, injunction,
habeas corpus, and the more indirect method of collateral
attack in a suit between private individuals wherein the ac-
tion of the administrative agency is decisive of the point in
litigation. In the second division may be placed the review
had when a party aggrieved adopts the method of judicial
review provided by the act creating the administrative
agency, or when the administrative agency itself appeals to a
court under the enabling act for the enforcement of its or-
ders.
16 296 U. S. 506 (1936).
17 As used in contradistinction with "administrative law."
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1. Writ of Certiorari.
Certiorari is a writ issuing out of a superior tribunal com-
manding the production of the record of an inferior tribunal
for examination by the higher authority. Originally it was
used to review only the action of a lower court, but for some
time it has been an accepted method of reviewing adminis-
trative action, provided such action is judicial in nature.
Paradoxically it is very difficult to determine whether ac-
tion is judicial in nature, and it seems that courts frequently
label the activity in question as judicial when they wish to ac-
cord it review, and term it non-judicial when review is sought
to be denied. A few of the more recent cases involving the
use of certiorari follow; from them the trend of the courts
is evident, as is the inconsistency sometimes manifested.
Certiorari was held not to lie to review an order of the
Fish and Game Commission of California, determining the
monthly capacity of a fish packing plant, because of the non-
judicial character of the commission's functions. 8 In the
same state certiorari was granted to review the determina-
tion by a county board of supervisors that the notice of
election for a proposed fire protection district had been given
in a proper newspaper, since it was considered that such
matter was quasi-judicial;' 9 but certiorari was denied to re-
view an order of the Corporation Commissioner of California
denying permission to sell securities because the proposed
plan of business was "unfair, unjust, or inequitable," since
such was considered solely an administrative function."0
In Florida, and elsewhere, the statutory exercise of quasi-
judicial functions by a court or commission is reviewable by
certiorari, where no other remedy is afforded.2' In Georgia
18 Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. State Fish & Game Commission, 75 Cal. App.
764, 243 P. 702 (1925).
19 Norman v. Cogswell, 82 Cal. App. 159, 255 P. 251 (1927).
20 Blue v. Division of Corporations, Department of Investments, 8 Cal. App.
(2d) 485, 48 P. (2d) 80 (1935).
21 Order regarding the operation of bus lines. Florida Motor Lines v. Rail-
road Commissioners, 100 Fla. 538, 129 So. 876 (1930).
DE NOVO JUDICIAL REVIEW
the judgment of county commissioners relative to the estab-
lishment of cemeteries and other institutions was considered
not of a judicial nature and therefore not reviewable by cer-
tiorari.22 In Illinois a board of review passing on the property
rights of tax-payers was held to act judicially, and its judg-
ments were reviewable.23
Michigan and Mississippi have adopted varying views as
to the legislative or judicial nature of an administrative act
regarding the addition or removal of lands from a political
district. Michigan holding the addition of lands of the non-
appealing petitioners to a township district was judicial in
nature and amenable to review by certiorari. 24 Whereas Mis-
sissippi denied certiorari to review an order eliminating ter-
ritory from a school district on the ground such order was
legislative and judicial.25
Not only has certiorari been held not available to review
legislative acts of an administrative agency, but acts purely
ministerial,2" or discretionary in nature if the administra-
tive official acts within his jurisdiction 27 also have not been
reviewable by certiorari. Admitting, of course, that such re-
view is permitted when the officer abuses his discretion.28
The number of cited cases could be multiplied many times,
but further elaboration of this problem, ancillary to the main
theme, is deemed unnecessary because certiorari is now large-
22 Hallman v. Atlanta Child's Home, 161 Ga. 247, 130 S. E. 814 (1925).
28 Jarman v. Board of Review of Schuyler County, 345 Ill. 248, 178 N. E.
91, 77 A. L. R. 1350 (1931). See elaborate note following this case in A. L. R.
24 School Dist. No. 1 Fractional of the Townships of Bethany & Pine River
and the City of St. Louis v. Joint Township Boards of Bethany & Pine River
Tps., 233 Mich. 327, 207 N. W. 5 -(1925).
25 Anderson v. Franklin County School Board, 164 Miss. 646, 146 So. 134
(1933).
26 Assessing omitted moneys and credits. State v. Canfield, 166 Minn. 414,
208 N. W. 181 (1926).
27 Building Inspector denying building permit. Livingston v. Peterson, 59
N. D. 104, 228 N. W. 816 (1930).
28 Granting building permit in violation of zoning ordinance. Morgan v.
Zoning Board of Review of Town of Warwick, 52 R. I. 338, 160 A. 922 (1932).
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ly a problem of local statutory construction, and because it
is inextricably intwined with the concept of judicial .power,
which defies definition.2"
2. Writ.of Prohibition.
Although less commonly used the writ of prohibition rep-
resents another extraordinary legal remedy which may be
used at times to obtain a measure of review of administra-
tive action. As in the case of the writ of certiorari it is usu-
ally available to arrest the proceedings of a lower tribunal
only when the function of the lower tribunal sought to be ar-
rested is of a judicial nature. Courts in passing upon this
writ's issuance in such cases encounter the same difficulty
with the concept of "judicial" as has been seen in the cer-
tiorari cases.
A Nevada court held that the writ did not lie to arrest
the Board of Governors of the State Bar from hearing a de
novo disciplinary proceeding, because such was not an ex-
ercise of a judicial function.8"
In connection with elections and returns therein and the
placing of names on ballots prohibition has been used with
varying results. In Ohio it was used to prevent the board of
elections from placing on the ballot the names of candidates
whose nominating petitions had not been filed within the
prescribed time;" t and in Missouri prohibition was held to
be the appropriate remedy to prevent election commissioners
from printing on the ballot the name of a candidate for state
senator, although in the instant case the secretary of state's
unauthorized certification of the candidate's name to the
election commissioners was held sufficient to justify prohibi-
tion issuing against the commissioners. 2 Prohibition was
29 For a likewise non-exhaustive treatment of this problem, see the anony-
mous editorial note, Review of Acts of Non-Judicial Bodies by Certiorari (1933-
34) 19 IA. L. REV. 609.
80 Haviland v. Foley, 39 P. (2d) 198 (Nev., 1935).
31 State ex rel. Bernon, 127 Oh. St. 204, 187 N. E. 733 (1933).
82 Bates v. Remmers, 325 Mo. 1175, 30 S. W. (2d) 609 (1930).
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held to be the proper procedure to restrain the secretary of
state of South Dakota from recognizing a petition nominating
a candidate for governor in 1930;11 and the same court four
years later held that the writ of prohibition would not lie
to restrain the secretary of state from certifying the name of
a Democratic nominee for state senator because of an al-
leged insufficiency of signatures to the nominating petition,
when it appeared that the certificate of the canvassing board,
.which purported to be made in complete compliance with
law, was conclusive on the secretary of state.34 The writ is
seen therefore to be ineffective to arrest acts of a ministerial
nature.
Among many other cases involving administrative review
by use of the writ of prohibition is the recent case of Simp-
kins v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma,3 5 wherein it
was held that prohibition was the proper remedy to prevent
the enforcement of a contempt order of the corporation com-
mission against the petitioner for violation of its order deny-
ing petitioner a certificate to construct and operate a tele-
phone exchange and connecting toll line.
3. Writ of Mandamus.
Mandamus, which was formerly a high prerogative writ,
is a writ which issues from a court of superior jurisdiction
directed to a private or municipal corporation or to any of
its officers, or to an executive, judicial, or administrative offi-
cer commanding the performance of a particular act, which
act is within the official duty of the respondent therein, or
to restore the petitioner to some rights or privileges of which
he has illegally been deprived.
The writ of mandamus is an accepted form of review of
the acts of administrative officers or boards which have acted
83 Putnam v. Pyle, 57 S. D. 250, 232 N. W. 20 (1930).
34 State ex rel. Jacobsen v. Morrison, 63 S. D. 31, 256 N. W. 150 (1934).
35 180 Okl. 108, 67 P. (2d) 961 (1937).
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arbitrarily or in abuse of the discretion vested in them." In
the absence of abuse, however, it is not available to compel
the performance of a discretionary act, 7 but it differs from
the writs of certiorari and prohibition, which are negative
in nature, in that mandamus will lie to compel the exercise
of a ministerial act.38
Although mandamus may be used in a variety of ways to
effect a judicial review of administrative action its uses will
not be considered exhaustively. It is most commonly used to*
effect a judicial review of administrative action in proceed-
ings to revoke, grant or procure licenses to petitioners be-
fore adminstrative agencies. The writ was held to be avail-
able to compel issuance of bail bond permit by the insurance
commissioner, if established that the commissioner had
denied the license arbitrarily and capriciously.39 It was held
not to lie where the discretion of the board of registration
in medicine was arbitrarily exercised in the denial of a cer-
tificate of registration based on reciprocity with other
states."
A New York court in passing upon a petition for writ of
mandamus to compel the issuance of a theater license, held
that although an arbitrary refusal of a license to a fit and
proper applicant was a wrong remediable by writ of man-
damus, the court must consider the discretion vested in the
licensing officer, but found that the discretion had not been
abused.4 The same court later held that mandamus would
lie to compel a village board and building committee to grant
36 People ex rel. Freeman v. Department of Public Welfare, 368 Ill. 505, 14
N. E. (2d) 642 (1938).
37 United States ex rel. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Interstate Com-
merce Commission, 68 App. D. C. 396, 98 F. (2d) 268 (1938).
38 United States ex rel. United States Borax Co. v. Ickes, 68 App. D. 'C.
399, 98 F. (2d) 271 (1938).
39 Ex Parte McDonough, 80 P. (2d) 485 (Cal. App., 1938). This was decided-
in a habeas corpus proceeding.
40 Salowitz v. Michigan State Board of Registration in Medicine, 235 Mich.
214, 280 N. W. 737 (1938).
41 Small v. Moss, 277 N. Y. 501. 14 N. E. (2d) 808 (1938).
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petitioner a permit for the erection of petroleum storage
tanks.42
To warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus the peti-
tioner must show his undeniable legal right to what he asks,
for mandamus lies to compel an officer to exercise his dis-
cretion but not the manner of such exercise. It was because
of his failure fo do so, since he 'had not made previous de-
mand upon the Park Board, that the reverend Father Cough-
lin was denied a permit to hold a mass meeting and speak in
a municipal stadium located in a public park in Chicago. 8
4. Writ of Quo Warranto.
The single jurisdiction of Illinois is seen to supply suffi-
cient cases representative of this problem involving the use
of the writ of quo warranto, which is commonly used to try
title to a corporate or other franchise or to a public or cor-
porate office.
It may be used to test the right of an administrative offi-
cer to 'hold office,44 and to test the legality of the organiza-
tion of an administrative body. 5 Ordinarily the writ can-
not be used as a direct review of the validity of administra-
tive acts. 6 Under a statute quo warranto was also used to
test the legality of the issuance of licenses by an adminis-
trative body.4
5. Writ of Injunction.
The writ of injunction, whereby a superior tribunal re-
strains a person from doing something complained of, is per-
42 Beckman v. Talbot, 278 N. Y. 146, 15 N. E. (2d) 556 (1938).
43 Coughlin v. Chicago Park District, 364 Ill. 90, 4 N. E. (2dy 1 (1936).
44 People ex rel. Jones v. Woodrum, 356 IMI. 427, 190 N. E. 916 (1934).
45 People v, Zoeller, 337 Ill. 362, 169 N. E. 228 (1924).
46 But see, People ex rel. Longress v. Board of Education of City of Quincy,
101 Ill. 308 (1882), where under a statute, quo warranto was held to be the
proper remedy where the board of education ordered a segregation of colored stu-
dents in violation of the constitution; but this case is perhaps weakened by the
lnter case of People ex rel. Nelson v. Taylor, 281 Ill. 355, 117 N. E. 1047 (1917).
47 Dram-shop license. People v. Heidelberg Garden, 233 Ill. 290, 84 N. E.
230 (1908).
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haps the extraordinary writ most frequently used to curb ad-
ministrative agencies, and to review their actions. The
United States Supreme Court has considered this problem
frequently.48 In one of its more recent cases it held that to
justify the use of the extraordinary power of a court of
equity to enjoin the action of the Kentucky Public Service
Commission from prosecuting an investigation of rates for gas
sold by complainants, something more must be involved than
the application of a statute in an unconstitutional manner
against complainant, and there must be an allegation and
proof of threatened injury under some of the recognized
sources of equitable jurisdiction.49
In an action to enjoin the Secretary of Interior from con-
summating a proposed exchange of public lands in New Mex-
ico for private lands, it was held that the existence of a stat-
ute enabling the transfer would not preclude the grant of
the injunction when the proposed transfer was to be carried
out in an unlawful manner. In this case it was also conclud-
ed that since the statute under which the Secretary of In-
terior was purporting to act was clear and unambiguous that
he could not contend by way of defense that an injunction
would not lie to control administrative officials in their con-
struction of a statute."°
In many cases involving the construction of pure food laws
it has been held that an injunction would not lie to restrain
the seizure and destruction of unwholesome food, since due
process of law in such cases of inherent emergency does not
require a hearing in advance of the destruction, and the peti-
tioner whose food is destroyed may bring an action for dam-
ages at law in the event of an illegal or unjust destruction.5
48 And so have the courts of many states, but it is to be stressed that this
writing does not intend to exhaust the case material on the divers problems con-
sidered therein.
49 Petroleum Exploration v. Public Service Commission of Kentucky, 304
U. S. 209 (1938).
50 Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 69 App. D. C. 29, 98 F. (2d) 308 (1938).
51 North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908), S. H.
Cranston, Inc. v. Department of Health of City of New York, 168 Misc. 749, 6
N. Y. S. (2d) 279 (1938).
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Mr. Justice Holmes in speaking for the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts summed up the law on this problem
when he said: "Of course there cannot be a trial by jury be-
fore killing an animal supposed to have a contagious disease,
and we assume that the legislature may authorize its de-
struction in such emergencies without a hearing beforehand.
But it does not follow that it can throw the loss on the owner
without a hearing. If he cannot be heard beforehand he may
be heard afterwards. The statute may provide for paying him
in case it should appear that his property was not what the
legislature has declared to be a nuisance, and may give him
a hearing in that way. If it does not do so, the statute may
leave those who act under it to proceed at their peril, and the
owner gets his hearing in an action against them." 52
An injunction is ordinarily considered a proper remedy,
however, to restrain administrative action when the public
welfare does not demand urgent action and when the prob-
able damage is considered irreparable.53
6. Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has been used to
review administrative action most frequently in cases in-
volving the deportation of aliens. In such cases jurisdiction
of the administrative to issue the deportation order exists
only if the person is an alien, and the courts have many times
held that the existence of this jurisdictional fact may be de-
termined on a writ of habeas corpus."
In connection with this problem Dean Landis has recently
made an interesting observation, that in cases involving de-
portation " an alien is held to be entitled to a judicial hear-
52 Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100, 10 L. R. A. 116, 23 Am.
St. Rep. 850 (1891).
53 Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190 (1933). Injunction restraining
order requiring elimination of a grade-crossing.
54 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 (1922). See also Van vleck, ADrn-
ISTRATIVE CONTROL Op ALIENS (1932).
55 Id.
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ing on the jurisdictional question of whether he is an alien;
whereas in cases involving the exclusion 16 of an alien the
administrative finding is held conclusive and not susceptible
of review by a court."
7. Collateral Attack Upon Administrative Action.
A less direct attack upon and review of adminstrative ac-
tion may result from suit between private parties. This may
occur in a variety of judicial proceedings wherein the exist-
ence of one or more facts of a jurisdictional nature in a pre-
vious controversy is necessary to the validity of the prior
proceedings. The commonest case illustrating this problem
is that involving title to land predicated upon a government
grant or patent.
The validity of a government patent is ordinarily conclu-
sive, and it may not be impeached in a collateral proceeding
unless it is void, and not merely irregular.5" Nor can a patent
be collaterally impeached although it was issued by the land
department in reliance upon false representations."
Administrative action may be collaterally attacked and
thereby reviewed in a civil damage suit against the adminis-
trative officer performing the action complained of. Such
suits are discouraged, however, because they infringe upon
the sovereign immunity from suit, and as a practical matter
they unduly result in a self-imposed restriction upon the ad-
ministrator's exercise of lawful discretion. They are fre-
quently the result of administrative action in the destruction
of unwholesome food, because, as-we have seen, an injunc-
tion will not lie to restrain the action sufficiently to permit
a hearing on the jurisdictional question of the wholesome-
ness of the food before the food is destroyed.6"
56 United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253 (1905).
57 Landis, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 131-132.
.58 Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U. S. 165 (1893).
59 Id.
60 Cases cited note 51, supra.
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8. Direct Review of Adminstrative Action.
The more developed and better drafted acts creating ad-
ministrative agencies usually contain extensive provisions
for judicial, (and sometimes, administrative) review of the
proceedings of the adminstrative agency. These provisions
may provide for appeal in one form or another to the courts,
or they may demand that the administrative agency itself
resort to the courts for the enforcement of its orders.
This method of direct review is admittedly less complex,
but it retains within it all the complexities inherent in the
major problem of the scope and extent of all methods of re-
view of administrative conduct.
IV. SCOPE OF REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION.
Notwithstanding the summary manner in which the meth-
ods of judicial review of administrative action have been
treated, it seems to be evident from what has gone before
that the main problem is not so much the proper form or
method the review should 'follow, as it is the scope, content
and extent of such review. This is readily appreciated when
one considers that if the administrative findings of fact are
to be conclusive that it matters little whether review is
sought directly or indirectly as by injunction, or the other
seven methods examined.
Any attempt at classification of .the problems inherent in
the general problem involves an investigatibn into the mean-
ing of basic terms such as law and fact. Nathan Isaacs."
classifies the possible scope of review into review of law, fact,
and discretion. But because questions of pure law, fact or
discretion are so rare it is felt that any classification along
such lines would be of little value.
In passing upon the finality and conclusiveness of ordi-
nary verdicts in a trial court, courts adopt one of several
61 Judicial Review of Administrative Findings (1921) 30 YALE L. JouR. 781.
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rules. Some affirm the judgment of the lower court if there
is any evidence to support it; others require substantial
evidence to support it; others reverse unless the court of
review would have held the same as the trial court if it had
been in its place; others reverse only when the verdict is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Which of these
is to be adopted by the judiciary in its consideration of the
finality of administrative actions?
In determining the conclusiveness of administrative ac-
tion it becomes of great importance to consider the scope
of the review accorded it in the reviewing court. It can be
of many types: The reviewing court can decide only upon
the evidence found in the record, it can hear evidence in
addition to that heard by the administrative agency, or it
can grant a trial de novo of the entire case. The wisdom of
following the latter procedure will be the subject matter of
the consideration of the remainder of this writing.
V. THE PROBLEM OF DE Novo JUDICIAL REvIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION.
As has already been indicated courts, laboring under the
belief that if there is to be government of laws and not of
men have concluded that a judicial review of adminstrative
action must be preserved. The "supremacy of the law" has
been eloquently advanced as a reason for such review by
courts that are quite conscious of the rapidity of the ad-
ministrative encroachments upon the province of the judi-
ciary.
In 1936 the Supreme Court of the United States in the
leading case of St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States,62
elevated " "supremacy of the law" to its present position of
judicial domination of the administrative.
62 298 U. S. 38 (1936).
65 Strictly speaking it had been "elevated" prior to this case, and this case
represents the "coronation."
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In this case the Supreme Court was asked to review a de-
cree of a federal district court dismissing a suit to restrain
the enforcement of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture
fixing maximum rates for services rendered by the petition-
ing stockyards company, under the authority vested in him
under the Packers and Stockyards Act.64 The alleged ground
for the issuance of the injunction sought was that the order
was confiscatory in violation of the due process provision of
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution:
The entire Court agreed that the decree of the district
court sustaining the Secretary's order should be affirmed, but
Mr. Justice Brandeis sharply dissented from a portion of the
reasoning of Chief Justice Hughes, on the finality to be ac-
corded findings of fact made by the Secretary of Agriculture.
Following the earlier cases of Crowell v. Benson "i and
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,"" a majority
of the court, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, def-
initely questioned the finality to be accorded administra-
tive fact findings when it said: "But to say that their (leg-
islative agencies') findings of fact may be made conclusive
where constitutional rights of liberty and property are in-
volved, although the evidence clearly establishes. that the
findings are wrong and constitutional rights have been in-
vaded, is to place those rights at the mercy of administrative
officials and seriously to impair the security inherent in our
judicial safeguards. That prospect, with our multiplication
of administrative agencies, is not one to be lightly regard-
ed." 67 Although the Court felt that the district court should
not have accorded the Secretary's findings the degree of
finality it indicated was proper in its opinion, when it said
"Is there anything in the Constitution which expressly makes
findings of fact by a jury of inexperienced laymen, if sup-
64 42 Stat. at L. 159, ch. 64, 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 181-229.
65 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
66 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
67 298 U. S. 38, 52 (1936).
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ported by substantial evidence, conclusive, that prohibits
Congress making findings of fact by a highly trained and
especially qualified administrative agency likewise conclu-
sive, provided they are supported by substantial evi-
dence?" "8 The Supreme Court nevertheless found that the
district court as a fact did hear evidence and examine into
the Secretary's findings. Therefore, it held that the erroneous
language was not so prejudicial as to require a reversal.
In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Brandeis attacked.
the position of the Chief Justice on the conclusiveness of
administrative determinations as to facts, quoting the state-
ment of the judge of the district court, concerning the rela-
tive weight given the findings of an inexperienced lay jury,
and that accorded the findings of an expert administrative
official. In addition he assailed the supremacy of law con-
cept implied in the opinion of the Chief Justice in these
words: "The supremacy of law demands that there be oppor-
tunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule
of law was applied; and whether the proceeding in which
facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly. To that ex-
tent, the person asserting a right, whatever its source, should
be entitled to the independent judgment of a court on the
ultimate question of constitutionality. But supremacy of
law does not demand that the correctness of every finding of
fact to which the rule of law is to be applied shall be sub-
ject to review by a court. If it did, the power of courts to set
aside findings of facts by an administrative tribunal would
be broader than their power to set aside a jury's verdict. The
Constitution contains no such command." "
Continuing with his opinion he dissented from the "major-
ity's" position on the ground of its improper application of
the doctrine of jurisdictional fact found in Crowell v. Ben-
son;"° on the impracticability of its result; on the ground
68 11 F. Supp. 322, 327.
69 298 U. S. 38, 84 (1936).
70 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
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that due process did not require judicial process, and con-
tended in conclusion that "Responsibility is the great devel-
oper of men," and asked concerning the majority's result,
"May it not tend to emasculate or demoralize the rate-mak-
ing body if ultimate responsibility is transferred to others?
To the capacity of men there is a limit. May it not impair
the quality of the work of the courts if this heavy task of re-
viewing questions of fact is assumed?" 1
To understand the majority's position at all, in the light
of the scathing denunciation by Mr. Justice Brandeis, partial-
ly depicted above, two prior cognate cases must be exam-
ined because upon them Chiet Justice Hughes predicated his
reasoning in the St. Joseph Stockyards case.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Ohio Valley Water Company v. Ben Avon Borough,7 2 held
that a determination by the Public Service Commission of
Pennsylvania of the valuation of property for rate making
purposes which did not provide for submitting that issue of
value to a judicial tribunal for its own independent judgment
on the law and facts, was invalid without looking to the rea-
sonableness of the particular rates. This case evoked a storm
of criticism.73 Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and Clarke dis-
sented, Brandeis being the articulate member of the dissent-
ing group.
In the case of C7,owell v. Benson "' the Supreme Court ex-
tended the doctrine of judicial review of administrative find-
ings of facts, and held that such review was mandatory with
regard to all "constitutional facts" and that such review must
be by trial de novo.
"The case grew out of a proceeding for compensation uin-
der the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
71 298 U. S. 38, 92 (1936).
72 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
78 See partial list of articles listed in note 30 of anonymous student editorial
note (1936), Judicial Review of Rate Orders of Administrative Boards: A Re-
examination, So HAR. L. R~v. 78, 82.
74 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
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pensation Act. The defendant had brought the compensation
proceeding against the petitioner, alleging among other
things that he had been injured while in the petitioner's em-
ploy and while performing services on the navigable waters
of the United States. The petitioner's answer denied that the
relation of employer and employee existed between himself
and the defendant. Under the administrative procedure pro-
vided by the Act there was a hearing and evidence presented
before a deputy commission of the Federal Employees' Com-
pensation Commission, who made a finding that-the injury
had occurred in the course of employment and awarded com-
pensation. Thereupon the petitioner brought the present bill
for an injunction in the federal district court under section
21 (b) of the Act, which provides that "if not in accordance
with law a compensation order may be suspended or set
aside in whole or in part through injunction proceedings...
instituted in the Federal district court." The ground of at-
tack on the award was that it was contrary to law because
the applicant was not in fact at the time of the injury in the
petitioner's employ and his claim was therefore, as a mat-
ter of law, not "within the jurisdiction" of the deputy com-
missioner. The fact of employment was thus made the de-
cisive issue. The district court declined to decide this issue
on the record of the testimony in the administrative proceed-
ing, or even to consider that record, but held that it must be
determined on wholly new evidence presented in court, since
the statute would be unconstitutional unless construed to
provide for such a judicial hearing de novo. The case having
been heard on the new evidence, the court found, contrary to
the administrative finding, that the applicant at the time of
the injury was not in fact in the petitioner's employ and
therefore enjoined enforcement of the award. This decree
was affirmed first by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and now
by the Supreme Court in an elaborate opinion by Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes. Mr. Justice Brandeis filed a persuasive dis-
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senting opinion, in which Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice
Roberts concurred." "
Having seen that the Supreme Court apparently requires
a review by trial de novo of facts found by an administrative
body whenever confiscation contrary to the due process
clauses is charged,7" it becomes of interest to see the reaction
of courts when such review is made mandatory by statute.7"
To be consistent with the decisions of -the Supreme Court
already examined it would seem that statutes providing for
review by trial de novo should be welcomed by the courts
as being declaratory of the law as laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Strangely enough such statutory
provisions are usually considered unconstitutional.
In the recent case of Borreson v. Departnent of Public
Welfare," the supreme court of Illinois held invalid a provi-
sion of the Old Age Assistance Act which permitted an un-
successful applicant to petition a circuit court for a trial de
novo on his application for assistance. The ground of decision
was that the invalid section of the Act delegated an executive
power to the judiciary in violation of the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers.7"
This case and the many which conform to it represent a
trend toward a judicial abdication of power that is strangely
inconsistent with the judiciary's grab for power made by the
75 Quoted from Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Determination of Questions of "Constitutional Fact" (1932), 80 U. or
PA. L. Rav. 1055.
76 See Note, Finality of Administrative Findings of Fact Since Crowell v.
Benson (1938), 24 VA. L. Rv. 653, for discussion of the judicial interpretation
of Crowell v. Benson.
77 It is true that perhaps the reviewable facts are limited to constitutional or
jurisdictional facts, but it is frequently difficult to see any distinction between
them and other kinds of facts. In fact, the same fact is construed to be of different
kinds in the cases involving aliens-seen supra.
78 369 Ill. 425, 14 N. E. (2d) 485 (1938). This case is by no means the only
case. It has been selected because it is typical of other cases involving the same
problem, and because it indicates the recent trend of the courts.
79 Justice Stone, dissenting pointed out that the act in question was com-
parable to the Workmen's Compensation Act which had never been considered
invalid.
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Supreme Court under its extension of the doctrine of "su-
premacy of law." This judicial self-limitation has been based
upon several grounds."0 The Court in the early case of Luther
v. Borden 81 declined to review a political question. Other
cases show a reluctance to exercise a power when the court
lacked the jurisdiction to enforce its decree. 2 And frequently
courts have declined review on the ground that no case or
controversy existed within the Judiciary Article of the Con-
stitution.83
The theory that the doctrine of separation of powers com-
pels the judicial renunciation of a statutory power of de novo
review of administrative action is fraught with dangers. The
difficulty of defining the three powers of government and of
classifying them into mutually exclusive departments has al-
ready been considered, along with the possibility that a court
seeking more power might take advantage of the statute by
deciding that the matter to be thus reviewed was judicial in
nature, and therefore, reviewable notwithstanding the doc-
trine of separation of powers. On the other hand a court
wishing to abdicate in favor of the administrative agency
could decline the statutory power of review by labeling the
matter to be reviewed as either legislative or executive.
VI. CONCLUSION.
A simple example reveals the anomalous condition of the
law on this subject. The Supreme Court of the United States
has decided that rate-making is a legislative function.84 It
has also held that when confiscation is alleged to result from
the application of a rate fixed by an administrative agency
that the aggrieved party is entitled to a de novo judicial
80 See, Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation (1924), 37 HAR. L. REV. 338;
and (1925) 39 HAR. L. REv. 221.
81 7 How. U. S. 1 (1849).
82 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911).
83 Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464 (1930).
84 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908).
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review of the propriety of the rate."5 This latter result seems
contrary to the theory of separation of powers in that it vests
in the judiciary the power to perform a legislative function.
No attempt will be made at a solution of this dilemma,
as the purpose of this writing is to present the problem in its
several aspects in the hope that once it is appreciated in its
entirety further inconsistencies will no longer creep into the
law on the subject.
A solution is-possible if the Supreme Court alters its view
as to the finality that is to be accorded to the actions of the
divers administrative agencies. Dean Landis predicts this,"8
and since it is dialectically sound it seems probable that
once more the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis
will become the view of a majority of the Justices of the
Supreme Court.
James J. Kearney.
College of Law, University of Notre Dame.
85 This is the theory of the Ohio Valley Water case, Crowell v. Benson, and
the St. Joseph Stockyards case.
86 Landis, op. dt. supra, note 8, at 141.
